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THE SEARCH FOR FAIR AGENCY PROCESS: The

Immigration Opinions of Judge Michael
Daly Hawkins 1994 to 2010
Lenni B. Benson*
"We review the work of government agencies with an
understandable degree of deference. No amount of deference,
however, can excuse the deliberate, calculated and cumulative
unfairness which occurred here." 1

I.

THE LIMITS OF BUREAUCRATIC PROCESS

Judge Michael Daly Hawkins has been a member of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals since 1994; but he has been concerned with the forms and
varieties of administrative or bureaucratic process his entire career. Perhaps
because he spent several intense early years as a lawyer in the U.S. Marine
Corps or because he grew up in a small Arizona town on the edge of the
Navajo nation, Judge Hawkins has been aware that due process guarantees
and the quality of the adjudication within a bureaucratic system may be
even more important than the procedure in general commercial or criminal
litigation. Judge Hawkins has been a scholar and architect of reform in
bureaucratic justice. He followed his Marine Corps service by serving as the
U.S. Attorney for the District of Arizona from 1976 to 1980. At 31, he was
the youngest U.S. attorney in Arizona history. In the private sector, he made
•
Professor of Law, New York Law School. I had the great honor of working for Judge
Hawkins in my first job after graduation from Arizona State University's College of Law in
1983. He was then a partner at Dushoffand Sacks. I was fortunate to continue to work with him
when he formed the firm of Daughton, Hawkins and Bacon and later become his partner when
that firm merged with Bryan Cave. I entered academia in the summer of 1994 just as he joined
the federal judiciary. I owe him many professional debts but notwithstanding those debts, I
know that one of Judge Hawkins's highest values is professional integrity and I have done my
best to both praise and critique his contributions to the field of immigration law during his
service as a Judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. As he continues as a Senior Judge, I
trust that he is far from finished in making contributions to this field and will make many more.
I would like to thank New York Law students Margaret Laufrnan (class of 2010) and Claire R.
Thomas (class of 2011) for their many contributions to this article. I also benefitted from the
comments of Nancy-Jo Merritt, Mathilde Cohen, and Anna 0. Law.
1.
Hawkins dissenting in Circu v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2004). As is
discussed infra the case was reheard en bane and remanded to the agency for reconsideration.
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significant contributions to local, state and national bar associations and
through pro bono leadership within private firms. He made a long lasting
and significant contribution during his years of service as a volunteer on the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). 2 From 1989 to
1994, Judge Hawkins served on the ACUS. During this period, ACUS
commissioned and analyzed several in-depth seminal studies of
immigration adjudication. Michael Hawkins, with his ACUS colleagues
from government, the judiciary, and the private sector, hammered out real
world recommendations for this complex field and many of their
recommendations became law either through legislative or administrative
reforms. 3 When he became a member of the federal judiciary, his role was
clearly altered. However, his commitment to fairness and integrity in
adjudication remained undiminished. This article will explore some of
Judge Hawkins's many immigration decisions, both majority and dissenting
opinions, which reflect his commitment to the preservation of a due process.
It is the pain and irony of bureaucratic legal process that the people
subjected to bureaucratic process are least able to navigate its complexity.
The most critical and life-changing decisions are often made by the small
claims court, the tribunal authority or the administrative adjudicator.
Moreover, the substantive and procedural rules within these specialty
bureaus may also be some of the most complex and contain labyrinths that
would ensnare even the most able and experienced advocate. Finding
competent, affordable counsel, training agency adjudicators and
administrators, and balancing crushing workloads against political pressure
to produce are just some of the ordinary challenges of bureaucratic process.
The last long tail of bureaucratic process may be judicial review, yet the
doctrines and traditions of judicial review of administrative action constrain
2.
The ACUS is an intergovernmental agency created by Congress to study issues of
administrative process. The Arizona State Law Journal devoted an entire issue to a symposium
discussing the legacy of the ACUS. See Victor G. Rosenblum, Contrasting Perspectives on the
Deeds and Demise of the Administrative Conference: Is There a Determinable Legacy?, 30
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1998). After a twenty year period of desuetude, Congress has reauthorized
funding for the ACUS in 2010. Hearings on the Administrative Conference of the United States
Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 th Cong
(2010) (Statement of Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Professor of Practice in Administrative Law,
Washington College of Law, American University), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
hearings/pdf/Lubbers 100520. pdf.
3.
See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency
Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1297 (1986); David A.
Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1247 (1990). Both of these important law review articles were informed by empirical
studies conducted on behalf of the ACUS that gave these authors access to the government
official involved in managing the agency procedures. These and similar studies made real and
lasting reforms for immigration adjudications.
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the scope of judicial review because our society values the efficiency and
independence of the administrative action.
Immigration law is a species of administrative law. For the vast majority
of people who are touched by immigration law, every interaction is with
one bureau of the federal government: the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS"). 4 As in other forms of federal administrative law, an
individual aggrieved by an adverse agency action has, after exhaustion of
the administrative process, recourse through the federal courts for limited
judicial review. Since 1961, Congress has largely channeled the judicial
review of final removal to the federal courts of appeals bypassing the
federal district courts. 5 In the past fifteen years, during Judge Hawkins's
tenure as a judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the immigration
workload of the federal courts has grown exponentially and now represents
around 13% to 20% of the appellate docket. 6 This growth has been even
4.
In 2002 Congress reorganized the immigration control functions and created a new
cabinet level agency, entitled the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). The former
Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice became part ofDHS. Only
the immigration administrative court, the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR")
and the appellate litigation team in the Office oflmmigration Litigation ("OIL") remained in the
Department of Justice under the control of the Attorney General. See Department of Justice
Agencies, U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/agencies/index-org.html (last visited Mar. 3,
2011); Department of Homeland Security Organizational Chart, DEP'T HOMELAND SEC.,
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0644.shtm (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
5.
While the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, provides for judicial
review of federal agency action, Congress has carved out limits to the form and scope of judicial
review of removal orders. In 1996 and again in 2005 Congress amended § 242 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1381, in an effort to streamline judicial
review in this area. As I have written elsewhere, the attempt to cut off access did not lead to
decline in the volume of petitions and moreover, increased the complexity and
constitutionalization of the field. See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, You Can't Get There From Here:
Managing Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405 (2007)
[hereinafter Benson, You Can't Get There] (suggesting that reform cannot be focused simply on
judicial review but must incorporate the various factors that interact within the system); Lenni
B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the Administrative
Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 37 (2007)
[hereinafter Benson, Making Paper Dolls] (evaluating why cuts lead to greater volume of work
and providing demographic data on the immigration workload of the federal courts); Lenni B.
Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration
Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411 (1997) [hereinafter Benson, Back to the Future] (analyzing
why limiting judicial review to constitutional issues will increase the constitutionalization of
immigration law generating a greater number of due process and other constitutional
challenges); Lenni B. Benson, The 'New World' ofJudicial Review of Removal Orders, 12 GEO.
lMMIGR. L.J. 233, 233-64 (1998) [hereinafter Benson, New World of Judicial Review]
(providing a description of the 1996 changes and an explanation of prior structure for judicial
review of deportation and exclusion orders).
6.
COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR Ass'N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM:
PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE
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more profound in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which represents the
court with the largest number of immigration cases and the highest
percentage of immigration cases on its docket. In 2009, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals received 3,351 petitions for review in immigration
removal cases. 7 This figure represented 27% of their total docket of 12,211
cases for 2009. 8
The administration of such a large volume of cases, a caseload that has
grown exponentially, has obviously required the judicial administration of
the court to consider approaches to managing the workload. 9 The Ninth
Circuit has utilized a variety of approaches including: greater reliance on
staff attorneys to prepare analysis of cases, 10 decisions that are not
designated for formal publication, 11 dispensing with oral argument in some
ADJUDICTION OF REMOVAL CASES 4-1, 4-2 (2010); see also Benson, You Can't Get There, supra
note 5; Benson, Making Paper Dolls, supra note 5 at 47. There was a marked 26% decline in
the number of immigration related petitions between 2008 and 2009 despite an overall increase
of 6% in the total workload of the court. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (2010),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics.aspx. While final BIA decisions declined 13% in
the same time period, the decline is still quite marked.
The percentage of immigration related cases is even higher if criminal cases are added. The
federal government has dramatically increased the number of immigration related criminal
prosecutions. See TRAC IMMIGRATION REPORT, SURGE IN IMMIGRATION PROSECUTIONS
CONTINUES (2008), available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/188/. According to the
2009 Ninth Circuit Annual Report, criminal appeals accounted for 13.7% of the total, with
appeals involving criminal immigration offenses ranking as the second only to criminal appeals
involving drug offenses. See U.S. DIST. COURTS, 2009 NINTH CIRCUIT ANNUAL REPORT 40
(2010), available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/publications/Annua1Report2009.pdf.
7.
See id.
8.
Id.
9.
See Benson, Making Paper Dolls, supra note 5 (discussing the rapid, exponential
growth in the volume of immigration appeals); see also, John R.B. Palmer, The Second
Circuit's "New Asylum Seekers": Responses to an Expanded Immigration Docket, 55 CATH. U.
L. REv. 965 (2006) (discussing the growth nationwide in immigration appeals).
10. In the Ninth Circuit, the Office of the Staff Attorneys ("OSA") "consists of over 35
attorneys who work for the entire court instead of for a single judge. Staff attorneys review the
motions in all of the court's cases, and research and present them to the judges for decision."
See Appellate Court Participants, OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXEC., HISTORY AND GUIDE TO THE
U.S.
COURTS,
http://207.41.19.15/web/sdocuments.nsf/94dcdf31963df55d88256453006e
368f/9f803c4b86ed923c882564530083dl 59?0penDocument (last visited Feb. 24, 2011 ).
11. When the Ninth Circuit publishes a decision that is nonprecedential the decision is
called a "memorandum" and not an "opinion." The court then marks the decision with this
footnote: "This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3." See e.g., Rutledge v. United States, No. 09-15198, Mem. at 1 (9th
Cir. 2011); United States v. Folsum, No. 10-50119, Mem. at 1 (9th Cir. 2011); see also U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIR., FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, NINTH
CIRCUIT RULES, CIRCUIT ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES 36-3(a), available at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/rules/rules.htm. There is a significant body of
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dispositions, 12 use of en bane panels to resolve some important issues, 13 and
the education and training of attorneys who regularly represent immigrants
in the circuit. 14
Certainly, one member of the entire Ninth Circuit judiciary was not
single-handedly responsible for designing or implementing any of these
reforms, but Judge Hawkins has taken an active role in many ways. He has
organized formal training for the incoming law clerks. He has participated
in annual trainings for immigration attorneys whom the court's staff
identifies as repeatedly presenting deficient or inadequate briefs. He has
literature discussing the impact of courts issuing nonprecedential decisions. See, e.g., Hillel Y.
Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the Federal Courts, 53 VILL. L. REV. 973 (2008); see
also, William R. Mills, The Shape of the Universe: The Impact of Unpublished Opinons on the
Process ofLegal Research, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 429 (2003).
12. The Ninth Circuit rules allow the panel to decide a case without oral argument. See
FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2) (stating "[o]ral argument must be allowed in every case unless a panel
of three judges who have examined the briefs and record unanimously agrees that oral argument
is unnecessary ...."); Telephone Interview by Claire Thomas with Denise Leonard, Assistant
Info. Sys. Manager for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Sept. 22, 2010) (indicating that
during the twelve month period ending June 2010, the court heard 1,809 arguments and 6,743
cases were decided after procedural rulings and 4,225 cases ended after submission of brief).
Based on these numbers, an estimated 63% of the appeals were handled without oral argument
in that twelve month period. See also David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology,
Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817 (2005) (criticizing the
number of unpublished decisions).
13. "En bane" cases are heard by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in panels
consisting of the Chief Judge of the Circuit and ten other judges selected more or less at random
from the active judges on the appellate court. See FED. R. APP. P. 35; 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (revised
Dec.
2009),
available
at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/rules/rules.
htm#l 109234.
According to FED. R. APP. P. 35(b)(l), a petition may be made for a hearing or rehearing en
bane when:
the panel decision conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme
Court or of the court to which the petition is addressed (with citation to the
conflicting case or cases) and consideration by the full court is therefore
necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or the
proceeding involves one or more questions of exceptional importance, each
of which must be concisely stated; for example, a petition may assert that a
proceeding presents a question of exceptional importance if it involves an
issue on which the panel decision conflicts with the authoritative decisions of
other United States Courts of Appeals that have addressed the issue.
See ANNA 0. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 158-162 (2010) (providing a
scholarly examination of the immigration cases in the Ninth Circuit and some of the approaches
used to manage the workload).
14. Telephone Interview with Judge Michael Daly Hawkins, Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals (Aug. 25, 2010) (describing mandatory "moot court" training for attorneys who are
unable to demonstrate competence as appellate counsel. The training instructs attorneys on the
elements of appellate briefs, the rules of appellate procedure and the observation of skilled
appellate advocates presenting oral argument.).
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helped to recruit attorneys from the government and the private bar to
present mock oral arguments and commentary to attorneys so that the
quality of representation can improve. 15
Still, the reality of immigration adjudication in the Ninth Circuit is that
there are a vast number of non-precedential, "unpublished" decisions issued
by three judge panels with a heavy role for the staff attorneys drafting all or
parts of the opinion. It is in this context that we examine the key
immigration cases of Judge Hawkins, knowing that no immigration opinion
can be written in the Ninth Circuit without an understanding that perhaps
one hundred or more immigration cases may be decided in a month within
the Ninth Circuit alone.
In an interview with Juan Osuna, a former member of the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), I learned that in 2003-04 the BIA
recognized a need for increased communication and contact with federal
judges. Mr. Osuna reported that "the BIA reached out to the Ninth Circuit
and invited one or more of the judges to attend an annual conference of the
BIA and to speak directly to the members of the BIA and the Board's
attorney staff. Judge Hawkins accepted and his presentation was very well
received." 16 Based on the initial meeting Judge Hawkins also worked with
the leadership of the Ninth Circuit and other Circuit Courts to understand
the changes within the Department of Justice that are contributing to the
exponential growth in petitions for review. 17 Judge Hawkins invited
members of the BIA and its leadership to attend annual meetings of the
Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference. 18 These initial meetings were the
beginning of a process that continues today and has expanded to Judges of
the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuit meeting with leadership
of the BIA. 19 Juan Osuna also reported that judges from other circuits have
also participated in productive conversations and exchanges about judicial
administration. 20
15. Interview with Judge Michael Daly Hawkins, supra note 14.
16. Telephone Interviews with Juan Osuna, former Chairman, Board of Immigration
Appeals (conducted between Aug. and Oct. 22, 2010). The comments of Mr. Osuna are his
personal recollections and are not meant to reflect the official opinion of the Department of
Justice or the U.S. government. Mr. Osuna was a member of the Board oflmmigration Appeals
from August 2000 to 2009. He served as chairman of the BIA from September 2008 to May
2009. In 2009 and 2010 he held other positions of responsibility within the Department of
Justice and as of January 2011 he is the Acting Director of the Executive Office for Immigration
Review. See Meet the Director, U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/eoir/meetdir.htm (last
visited Mar. 3, 2011).
17. Telephone Interviews with Juan Osuna, supra note 16.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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This positive assessment from the former chair of the BIA is an example
of how Judge Hawkins is able to build communication even if he is engaged
in a serious critique of the agency performance. For example, Judge
Hawkins reported in an interview he gave following a high level meeting
with officials from the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"),
that he seriously discussed "shaming" by the Circuit Courts as a possible
way to improve adjudication before the agency. 21 He said that the audience
applauded when he suggested that the Ninth Circuit could easily improve
adjudication before the EOIR by naming immigration judges in its
opinions. 22 This is a federal judicial practice that Chairman Osuana strongly
opposes. 23
By suggesting that opinions name the immigration judges, Judge
Hawkins seriously endorsed a need for greater transparency and
accountability. The volume of the cases, the lack of support resources such
as court personnel and law clerks, the existing management culture and
practices have created a cloud of anonymity. Moreover, the difficulty of
managing complex decision-making required by deportation and asylum
cases combined with all of these factors to reduce the effectiveness and
quality of the adjudication in the immigration courts. 24 Appellate courts can
remand erroneous decisions to the agency and can point out procedural
errors, but they have no funds to address the budget shortfalls of the
administrative adjudicator, nor can they create statutory substantive and
procedural reforms that might reduce the problems and thus the rate of
appeal.
When an immigration case reaches the federal courts, the entire removal
proceeding record is transmitted to the court. Judicial review requires that
21. See Solomon Moore & Ann M. Simmons, Immigrant Pleas Crushing Federal
Appellate Courts: As Caseloads Skyrocket, Judges Blame the Work Done by the Board of
Immigration Appeals, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2005, at
l,
available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/may/02/local/me-backlog2/5.
22. While the Ninth Circuit does not routinely name individual immigration judges in its
decisions, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals names the judge at the top comer of the slip
opinions posted on the court's website and formally names them in the body of the opinion.
This was a procedure I recommended as a way of increasing transparency and accountability
and allowing individual immigration judges to find appellate case law addressing their
administrative decisions. See Benson, You Can't Get There, supra note 5, at 427; see also
Sydenham B. Alexander, A Political Response to the Crisis in Immigration Courts, 21 GEO.
lMMIGR. L.J. 1, 31 n.161 (2006) (calling for reforms in the administrative process).
23. Telephone Interviews with Juan Osuna, supra note 16.
24. The vast majority of the opinions prepared by immigration judges are dictated and few
are formally published. Of the more than 30,000 decisions rendered by the appellate body, the
Board of Immigration Appeals, only a fraction are formally published or made available on the
agency website. See AG/BIA Decisions Listing, EOIR VIRTUAL LAW LIBRARY,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/lib_indecitnet.htrnl (last visited Feb. 25, 2011 ).
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the court consider the entire record-a record that can easily exceed 400 to
600 pages in a contested asylum case. Moreover, immigration court
proceedings are not officially transcribed. The proceedings are recorded and
a transcript is only prepared if there is an appeal. These transcripts can be
rough, both because the pace of the litigation is quite fast and because the
average immigration judge handles a docket of more than 1,200 cases a
year. Unfortunately, most of the arguments, motions and decisions
presented in removal proceedings are made orally. The press of the
immigration court docket requires immigration judges to dictate a final
decision with rarely an opportunity to edit and rewrite the final order. 25
Well aware of these practical and budgetary limitations, Judge Hawkins and
other members of the federal judiciary have tried to work with leadership
within the EOIR to improve the procedures and the court's workloads. In
testimony before Congress, several members of the federal judiciary decried
the lack of resources for immigration judges, a problem Judge Hawkins
frequently noted. 26
When I asked Juan Osuna to evaluate Judge Hawkins contribution, he
responded that the Judge's efforts:
have been critically important to exchange information and ideas
that make the process work better. The federal courts have learned
much more about the process of adjudication of cases in the
immigration court system, including the overwhelming numbers of
cases, the resource constraints that the immigration courts work
under, the complexity of the legal and factual issues that come
before immigration judges and the BIA, and the various federal
government players that have a significant role in the process. 27

He continued to say that the BIA and immigration courts also benefitted
from the exchange:
The immigration courts and the BIA have learned first-hand from
Judge Hawkins and others about the issues that the federal courts
see, about how federal judges look at the immigration cases that
reach them, and about recurring problems that arise in cases and
ideas on how to address them. This has informed and contributed
to an overall improvement in the process at all levels. 28

25. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BARASS'N, supra note 6, at 3-16.
26. See, e.g., Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Chief Judge John M. Walker, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony .cfm?id= l 845&wit_id=52 l 4.
27. Telephone Interviews and Emails with Juan Osuna, supra note 16.
28. Id.
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Judge Hawkins and other members of the Ninth Circuit have also
commented that the government attorneys representing the government in
the removal hearings also have a responsibility for the development of an
adequate administrative record. 29 In an interview, Judge Hawkins said it is
quite distressing to see government counsel failing to take an adequate role
to clarify an important factual point in a record, or responding with silence
to counsel's statutory arguments about a respondent's eligibility for relief. 30
Judge Hawkins said it is critical to the efficiency and accuracy of the
administrative system that the "government has a duty to do justice and that
means being prepared and engaged in an administrative process." 31 For
example, in Cinapian v. Holder, Judge Hawkins found that the government
made a mistake in failing to notify the respondents in advance of the
hearing that the government would challenge their documents establishing
prior residence in Iran. 32 This type of ambush was a shortcut that became a
mistake requiring remand. 33
While Congress and the Department of Justice must shoulder the
responsibility for full reform, the federal circuit courts can affect some
change. In the next section of this article, I will address several of the cases
in which Judge Hawkins presented majority or dissenting opinions that
strongly indicate how the federal judiciary must continue to serve as (1) the
guardians of individual rights, (2) the necessary protector of government
independence, and (3) at times, the engine for reform.
II.

A REFEREE WHO WILL CALL A FOUL

Scholars of administrative law and immigration law know that the scope
of review is narrow and extremely deferential to the agencies. Moreover,
since the late 1880s, immigration cases have developed a jurisprudence
resulting in an extremely deferential doctrine-the plenary power
doctrine-that may insulate government action from even constitutional
limitations. 34 Still, since 1903, the Supreme Court has affirmed that people
29. John T. Noonan, Jr., Immigration Law 2006, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 905, 907--09 (2006)
(citing a transcript from an immigration case and noting that the trial attorney did nothing to
improve or clarify the administrative record).
30. Interview with Judge Michael Hawkins, supra note 14.
31. Id.
32. 567 F.3d 1067, 1076 (2009).
33. Id. at 1076-77.
34. Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1703 (1992)
(explaining how courts focus on procedure to give non-citizens opportunities perhaps in part
because they lack full incorporation into the substantive protections of the Constitution).
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within the United States are entitled to due process of law and immigration
hearings must meet a minimum guarantee of due process to ensure that the
hearing is not fundamentally unfair. 35 Thus, in some rare circumstances,
members of the federal judiciary will examine the procedures used by the
government to secure a removal order and find that the government has
gone beyond those very broad limits of fundamental fairness.
Still, while judicial review is structured through the lens of
administrative law, Judge Hawkins never seems to lose understanding of the
larger context that removal decisions are as important as most criminal
cases and in many situations much more significant to the lives involved. So
while his opinions stay within the structure of judicial review of agency
action, they reflect a real concern for the process used to adjudicate the facts
and although he cannot alter the substantive rules, he is willing to question
whether the rules are being applied fairly.
His opinions show a preference for representation, evidence, notice,
accurate translation, remedies for long delays, matters of context, separation
of powers, and acknowledgement of the problems in the system.
For example, in a case where the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")
rejected a woman's claim that she never received notice of her removal
hearing and in the context of a motion to reopen an in absentia hearing to
allow her to apply for cancellation of removal, the government argued for a
very high burden of proof to establish the existence of a negative-that she
prove she did not receive notice sent by regular mail. 36 In Salta v. INS, 37 the
government argued it was appropriate to place the burden on the respondent
to establish a lack of notice because both the BIA and the Ninth Circuit had
previously ruled that if an individual is challenging receipt of service where
the government used certified mail, the challenger had to provide evidence
that her mailing address has remained unchanged, that neither she
nor a responsible party working or residing at that address refused
service, and that there was nondelivery or improper delivery by
the Postal Service, then she has rebutted the presumption of
effective service. If this is the case, the burden shifts to the INS to
show that a responsible party refused service. 38

35. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903); Gerald L. Neuman, The Constitutional
Requirement of 'Some Evidence', 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 631, 637 (1988) (discussing early
immigration cases and the due process requirement that removal orders be supported by "some
evidence").
36. Salta v. 1.N.S., 314 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2002).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1079 (quoting Arrieta v. l.N.S., 117 F.3d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1997)).
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Judge Hawkins wrote that while this burden of proof might make sense
if an individual is challenging certified mail,
delivery by regular mail does not raise the same "strong
presumption" as certified mail, and less should be required to
rebut such a presumption. Indeed, many of the previously required
forms of evidence, such as documentary evidence from the Postal
Service or proof that no responsible person refused service, only
make sense in the context of certified mail. We therefore hold that
it was an abuse of discretion for the BIA and the IJ to apply the
[higher] evidentiary requirements in denying Salta's motion to
reopen. 39

The panel then remanded the case to the BIA for remand to the Immigration
Judge to allow Ms. Salta to supply an affidavit of non-receipt and for the
agency to consider whether this type of evidence alone should be sufficient
where the government only used regular mail. 40
This decision is a good example of Judge Hawkins acting as referee. He
is not "calling the game" and mandating that the agency reopen the
proceedings, but instead, he patiently explains where the agency
overstepped the line in shifting burdens and reminds it of the important
context, that Ms. Salta was a person who had initially appeared for her
hearing and sought an opportunity to submit relief-relief only available to
someone who had lived more than ten years within the United States. While
it may be understandable why the agency would want to defend notice by
regular mail, the blind application of a higher burden of proof used to rebut
certified mail makes it almost impossible for an individual to prove lack of
notice. 41
While the government and agency adjudicators might prefer a "bright
line" rule that shifts the burden uniformly to the challenger to disprove
notice, Judge Hawkins's decision, while decided on general statutory and
regulatory grounds, echoes the constitutional case law on the importance of
providing adequate notice. 42
The INA permits service of NTAs and hearing notices either in
person or by mail. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c). Service by mail is
statutorily sufficient so long as the notice was sent to "the last
address provided by the alien in accordance with subsection
(a)(l)(F) of this section." Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A)
(authorizing IJs to enter removal orders in absentia only "if the
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at 1080.
There is no reported decision issued after remand.
See, e.g., Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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Service establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convmcmg
evidence that . . . notice was . . . provided at the most recent
address provided under section 1229(a)(l)(F) of this title."). What
it means to be an address "provided under section 1229(a)(l)(F),"
in tum, was the focus of Matter of G-Y-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 181
(BIA 2001) (en bane), which held that an alien can be said to have
"provided" his address to the Service "under"§ 1229(a)(l)(F) only
if he has actually received, or can be fairly charged with receiving,
the specific advisals and warnings enumerated at § 1229(a)(l)(F)
[footnote omitted] regarding the consequences of his failure to
provide and update his address once removal proceedings have
begun. That advisal is usually conveyed to an alien for the first
time in an NTA. G-Y-R-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 187. Because the
parties agree that Al Mutarreb never actually received his NTA,
G-Y-R-'s application in this case turns upon whether Al Mutarreb
can be "properly charged" with having received notice. The parties
agree that whether an alien is properly charged with receiving an
NTA he did not in fact get requires a due process inquirywhether the method of service is "'reasonably calculated, under all
the circumstances, to appri[ s]e interested parties of the pendency
of the action."' Matter of M- D-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 540, 542 (BIA
2002) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950)); accord
Farhoudv. INS, 122 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1997). 43

Like the referee who ensures that the play is fair for persons involved in
a sports event, Judge Hawkins ensured that all participants in his courtroom
were allotted their due process rights. His decisions reflect a concern for
ensuring that procedural safeguards do not go by the wayside simply
because the respondent is not a citizen of the United States.
For example, in Colmenar v. INS, Judge Hawkins reviewed a decision of
the BIA denying asylum to a native and citizen of the Philippines. 44
Colmenar's claim was based on political persecution. Judge Hawkins found
that Colmenar was not given a full and fair opportunity to present evidence
in support of his asylum claim in his hearing before an immigration judge.
The immigration judge indicated at the beginning of the hearing that he had
already judged Colmenar's case referring to the case as, "a possible medical
malpractice suit rather than anything else."45 The immigration judge also
refused to allow Colmenar to testify regarding certain details, which would

43.
44.
45.

Al Mutarreb v. Holder, 561 F.3d 1023, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2009).
210 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 969.
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have provided elaboration of his fears. 46 Judge Hawkins closed his decision
with strong language:
Judges do little to impress the world that this country is the last
best hope for freedom by displaying the hard hand and closed
mind of the forces asylum seekers are fleeing. Better that we hear
these claims out fully and fairly and then make an informed
judgment on the merits. This is consistent with our role as judges,
and the values of our Constitution demand no less. 47

Additionally, in Lopez-Galarza v. INS, Judge Hawkins reviewed a BIA
decision in which a native and citizen of Nicaragua and her son were
ordered removed from the U.S. 48 In this case, Ms. Lopez-Galarza had been
raped, sexually-abused and physically imprisoned on account of her
political opinion. 49 Judge Hawkins stated that "[i]n exercising its discretion
to deny asylum in this case, the BIA simply failed to consider the level of
atrocity of past persecution as the law of this Circuit and the BIA's own
precedent requires." 50 Judge Hawkins criticized the BIA and explained that
"[b]ecause the BIA deviated from the law of this Circuit as well as from its
own precedent, its decision was 'contrary to law' and therefore an abuse of
decision." 51 Judge Hawkins decided that Ms. Lopez-Galarza established her
eligibility for asylum through a sufficient demonstration of past
persecution. 52 By remanding her case back to the BIA in order to allow the
BIA panel to decide whether Ms. Lopez-Garcia and her son were entitled to
asylum as a matter of discretion, Judge Hawkins again took on the role of a
referee.
At times, Judge Hawkins has had to raise his objections by dissent. In
Circu v. Ashcroft, the Immigration Judge relied on a State Department
report describing human rights and religious freedom in Romania. 53 This
46. Id. at 970.
47. Id. at 973.
48. 99 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1996).
49. Id. at 957.
50. Id. at 963.
51. Id. Prior to 1996, federal courts could reverse a BIA decision where the agency abused
its discretion, a standard but difficult hurdle in judicial review of administrative action. One of
the changes made to the scope of judicial review after 1996 was to insulate all decisions
committed to agency discretion from judicial review. Recently the ABA Commission on
Immigration published a report calling for the restoration of judicial review of abuse of
discretion. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 6, at 3-9; see also Daniel
Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, and the 'Rule' of
Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rev. 161 (2006).
52. Lopez-Galarza, 99 F.3d at 960.
53. 389 F.3d 938, 939 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated en bane sub nom. Circu v. Gonzales, 450
F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2006).
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report was dated two years after the original removal hearing. According to
the Immigration Judge, this report contradicted the Respondent's claim of
religious persecution. 54 The Immigration Judge gave no notice to the
Respondent and used the report a full two years after the original hearing
was held. 55 Further, this error was appealed to the BIA but the Board found
no error in failing to give the Respondent notice and opportunity to respond
to the report. 56 Judge Hawkins noted that this was untenable and he
vigorously dissented. 57 He found that immigration judge's use of a
controversial report without providing an opportunity to Ms. Circu to
respond was a violation of fundamental fairness. 58 Later the case was
reheard en bane and although Judge Hawkins was not a member of that en
bane panel, the Ninth Circuit adopted his position and remanded the case to
the agency saying that the BIA's action had violated due process and
prejudiced the Respondent. 59
Judge Hawkins also demonstrated his concern for ensuring the due
process of participants in his courtroom in the case of Tawadrus v. Ashcroft,
which involved an Egyptian national who claimed he was persecuted
through economic sanctions for his failure to convert to Islam. 60 At the
master calendar hearing, 61 Tawadrus was represented by counsel. 62 The
immigration judge set a date for a merits hearing, but counsel could not
make it, and the immigration judge reset the merits hearing for six months
later. 63 Tawadrus objected to the new date stating he had to get his case
heard as expeditiously as possible in order to get his children out of Egypt. 64
The immigration judge moved the hearing to the same afternoon. 65 Citing a
schedule conflict, Tawadrus' counsel withdrew. 66 Tawadrus appeared later
that afternoon and proceeded without counsel. 67 The immigration judge
denied asylum and withholding. 68 Tawadrus (with new counsel) appealed
54. Id.
55. Id. at 942.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 941-43.
58. Id. at 943.
59. Circu v. Gonzales, 450 F. 3d 990 (9th Cir. 2006).
60. 364 F.3d 1099, 1101 (9th Cir. 2004).
61. A master calendar hearing is usually the first hearing in a removal case. The hearing is
used by the immigration judge to determine the scope of the pleadings and the issues in
contention and to identify what relief, if any, the respondent will seek in a "merits hearing."
62. Tawadrus, 364 F.3d at 1101.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1102.
68. Id.
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the decision to the BIA. 69 The BIA summarily affirmed the decision of the
immigration judge without opinion. 70 Judge Hawkins again located the right
to counsel among the rights within the Fifth Amendment guaranteed by due
process. 71 Judge Hawkins found that the immigration judge's failure to
inquire specifically whether petitioner wished to continue without a lawyer
and receive a knowing and voluntary affirmative response was an effective
denial of right to counsel. 72 By not having counsel, Tawadrus was unable to
present a clear and internally consistent account and also unknowingly
abandoned claims for relief. These failures established that Mr. Tawadrus
was prejudiced by the immigration judge action. 73
Further, in Cinapian v. Holder, Judge Hawkins addressed the importance
of rights related to the admission of evidence in his courtroom. In this case,
the Iranian respondents claimed persecution on account of religion. 74 To
corroborate their claim, Respondents provided a certificate from an
Armenian church and an original birth certificate of the husband. 75 DHS
submitted these documents for forensic analysis. 76 The DHS attorney made
the forensic reports available to petitioners for the first time at their asylum
hearing. 77 Counsel for the Respondents objected, claiming that the reports
should have been available prior to the hearing so that the Respondents had
an opportunity to review and respond to the content. 78 Further,
Respondents' counsel should have had an opportunity to cross-examine the
author of the reports. 79 The immigration judge refused to reset the case or
grant a continuance to allow time to respond to the forensic evidence. 80
Further, the immigration judge eventually concluded that the Respondents
were not credible because they could not present evidence to corroborate
that the family had lived in Iran. 81
Judge Hawkins pointed out that while the Federal Rules of Evidence do
not formally apply in immigration proceedings, "evidence is admissible
only if it is probative, and its use is fundamentally fair." 82 Judge Hawkins
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1103.
Id. at 1103-05.
Id. at 1106.
567 F.3d 1067, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1071.
Id.
Id. at 1071-72.
Id. at 1072.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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stressed the importance of the right to confront evidence and cross-examine
witnesses in immigration cases. 83 He concluded that the failure of the
government to make the reports available in advance of the hearing or to
make the report's author available for cross-examination combined with the
immigration judge's subsequent consideration of the reports, denied the
Iranian respondents a fair hearing. 84
In dissent, Judge Hawkins identified the challenge of judicial review of
administrative hearings that inadequately develop a claim for asylum:
Asylum cases, by their very nature, are difficult to review. The
claims relate to events in faraway places, often described by
individuals who speak an unfamiliar language, and rarely, if ever,
does the government present evidence. The asylum seeker's
testimony is often the sole basis for decision, and the hearing
transcript, in turn, provides the sole basis for our review ....
Because an adequate record is so essential to meaningful review,
we as an appellate body must insist on a record that is properly
translated and transcribed. Because this record cannot even
charitably be described as adequate, I believe the proper course
would be to grant the petition for review and remand the transcript
for clarification. 85
Moreover, Judge Hawkins seems well aware that the complexity of
immigration law with its multiple agency divisions, the variety of visa
petitions and procedures, and the lack of coordination within the agency can
also create fundamental unfairness. In a case regarding a Congolese
woman's right to immigrate through marriage, Judge Hawkins took the time
in the dissent to unwind the complex procedural history of the case. He
began by patiently explaining:
This case brings Abbott & Costello's "Who's on First" routine
to life. A woman seeks a visa as the spouse of a United States
citizen. Her husband first signs the application on her behalf, then
withdraws it saying the marriage was a sham, only to file a second
application, saying the withdrawal was done in haste and that the
marriage was legitimate all along. In the meantime, making use of
the husband's initial withdrawal, the government seeks and
obtains a removal order based on marriage fraud. She appeals the
removal order to the BIA. When her visa application is denied, she
appeals that also and asks the BIA to consolidate the two
obviously related matters. Without explanation, the BIA fails to
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 1073-75.
Id. at 1075.
Singh v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d. 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2004) (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
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act on Ngongo's efforts to consolidate and her cases proceed on
two tracks, as two separate appeals. Not only does the BIA fail to
act on Ngongo's consolidation request, it sends the visa denial to a
BIA merits panel, and, at nearly the same time, sends the removal
appeal to a single BIA member for summary affirmance. 86

Unlike the majority of the panel who affirmed the removal order, it is
clear that Judge Hawkins was willing to untangle a bureaucratic mess. At
the end of his dissent he wrote:
Without even asking for an explanation, the panel majority
seems content to approve the removal (deportation) of someone
the agency says has entered into a fraudulent marriage, while the
same agency finds no proof that fraudulent marriage exists. No
responsible, sane system of justice should sanction such a result.
Alphonsine Ngongo is either eligible to proceed with her visa
application or removable because of fraudulent marriage-she
cannot be both. 87

Throughout his opinions this search for fairness and rationality is evident
as he digs through the brush and bramble of immigration cases and
administrative obfuscation. Not every judge works as hard as Judge
Hawkins to try to not only produce the right result in the particular case, but
to educate the public and the bureaucracy about the defects of the
immigration procedures at the same time.
III.

PRESERVING THE ROLE OF THE COURT

Judge Hawkins joined the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the fall of
1994. 88 In 1996 Congress passed two bills amending the provisions
governing judicial review of removal proceedings. 89 For the next ten years,
the federal courts heard frequent arguments from both individual and
government counsel about the scope and form of judicial review in this
area. 90 When the restrictions on judicial review of immigration cases first
became law, many, including a significant number of federal judges,

86. Ngongo v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2005) (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 826.
88. Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference 2009: Speakers, Panelists and Special Guests, U.S.
COURTS 9TH CIRCUIT, OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXEC., http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/jc2009/
promo/speakers.html#hawkins (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
89. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214; Illegallmmigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-54.
90. Seeking Review Symposium, 51 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1 (2007).
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believed that the Congress had exercised legitimate authority in foreclosing
judicial review of many types of claims. 91 On its face, the language of the
statute certainly purports to close the courthouse to claims by aliens in
expedited removal proceedings, to aliens who have been convicted of
aggravated felonies, and to preclude review of claims where the ultimate
decision about relief is committed to the agency discretion. 92 But as the
litigation developed, two major themes undergirded the ability of noncitizens to seek review: (1) if the case law did not clearly establish that a
particular conviction fit the categorical bar, he or she continued to have a
right to judicial review; and (2) if a petition for review was barred, the
individual might have continued access to federal courts via a writ of
habeas corpus. 93 In this first category of cases, one of the critical aspects of
the doctrine is the approach the court takes to reading the breadth of the
statutory preclusions. While some judges may have claimed to conduct
straight textual reading of the preclusions, many others, including Judge
Hawkins, examined the context of the preclusions and worried about the
unfettered scope of agency action if the preclusion causes were read too
broadly.
In an early case where the government argued that all review was
precluded, Judge Hawkins held that notwithstanding a bar on a direct
petition for review to the Court of Appeals, the respondent had the right to
seek habeas review in the district court to determine if his constitutional
rights had been violated in the original immigration hearing. 94 In Dearinger
ex rel. Volkova v. INS, a writ of habeas corpus was raised on behalf of the
asylum seeker. 95 Judge Hawkins held that the district court had jurisdiction
over the habeas claim, and jurisdiction was not precluded by the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibilities Act ("IIRIRA"). 96 In
concluding that jurisdiction was valid, Judge Hawkins analyzed the
petitioner's claim of error based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 97
Judge Hawkins located the right to counsel in deportation proceedings as
91. See David R. McConnell, Judicial Review Under the Immigration and National Act:
Habeas Corpus and the Coming of REAL ID (1996-2005), 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 75 (2007)
(written by a senior attorney in the Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Rights Division,
Department of Justice, discussing history of Congressional attempts to control access to the
federal courts and judicial review of immigration cases).
92. See Kanstroom, supra note 51 (discussing limitation on judicial review of
discretionary decisions).
93. Benson, Back to the Future, supra note 5; Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus,
Executive Detention, and the Removal ofAliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 988 (1998).
94. Dearinger ex rel. Volkova v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2000).
95. Id. at 1044.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1044-45.
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arising under the Fifth Amendment. 98 He went on to hold that where an
alien is prevented from filing an appeal in immigration proceedings due to
counsel's error, the error deprives the alien of the appellate process entirely
and prejudice is presumed. 99 Judge Hawkins rejected the Government's
argument that due process in immigration does not require an appeal to the
U.S. court of appeals. 100 His reasoning was that just because an alien may
not have a constitutional right to an appeal, there may still be a
constitutional violation where deprivation of the right is ineffective
assistance of counsel. 101
Even if attorney error did not prevent access to the federal courts,
Congress has also blocked that access by precluding or dramatically
limiting judicial review of many immigration decisions. Perhaps one of the
most dramatic examples illustrating Congressional "court stripping" 102 is
the Ninth Circuit opinion in Meng Li v. Eddy. 103 In this case, a Chinese
business woman, Ms. Meng Li, presented a valid passport and a visa for a
business visit (B-1) to the U.S. inspectors in Anchorage, Alaska. 104
Although her ultimate destination was New York, the government inspected
all foreign passengers before allowing them to proceed to flights in the
interior of the United States. 105 Ms. Li had also applied to INS for
classification as an L-1 intracompany transferee; while her flight was
heading for the United States, that petition was approved, but Ms. Li was
unaware of the approval. 106 When Ms. Li reached Anchorage, the
immigration inspector accused Ms. Li of fraud, but would not tell her why;
it later came to light that the inspector thought incorrectly that a person with
a B-1 visa was not permitted to enter the US if an L-1 petition had also been

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. "Court stripping" or "jurisdiction stripping" is a reference to statutes that block access
to judicial review. See, e.g., Richard Fallon, Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L.
REV. 1043 (2010).
103. 259 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated and appeal dismissed by Liv. Eddy, 324 F.3d
1109 (9th Cir. 2003). This case was vacated as moot because more than five years passed from
the time of the original exclusion order and according to the government Ms. Li would suffer no
further consequences of the order. The Court perhaps misunderstands that any order of
exclusion can later be a basis for determining whether an individual is subject to permanent bars
to admission to the U.S. for material misrepresentation or fraud. See generally INA §
212(a)(6)(c), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(6)(c) (Westlaw through P.L. 111-382, approved 2011).
104. Li, 259 F.3d at 1133.
105. Id.
106. Email from Margaret D. Stock, Adjunct Professor, University of Alaska Anchorage to
Lenni Benson, Professor of Law, New York Law School (Oct. 29, 2010) (on file with author).
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approved on the person's behalf. 107 Ms. Li did not speak fluent English, but
tried to explain to the inspectors that she was traveling to New York on
behalf of her Chinese employer, a real estate developer. 108 In New York she
expected to complete negotiations for the purchase of materials and fixtures
for shipment to China. 109 The inspector apparently misunderstood the law
related to B-1 and L-1 visas and after questioning Ms. Li, informed her that
she was going to be returned to China on the next available flight and that
she was formally ordered excluded from the United States. 110 The Ninth
Circuit majority opinion described the inspector's findings as follows:
The order itself was issued on a form stating that the INS had
determined the named alien to be excludable because of an attempt
to enter the country through fraud or misrepresentation. The form
included a space for a description of the nature of the fraud or
misrepresentation, but the INS left that space blank in Li's
order. 111

After hearing she was to be excluded, Ms. Li became distraught and the
interpreter told the inspector that Ms. Li was afraid to return to China. 112
Apparently, the interpreter believed the only way to delay Ms. Li's
departure was to have her seek political asylum. 113 The interpreter was not
completely incorrect because the statute and regulations provide that
expedited removal cannot be used if a person has a "credible fear" of
returning to his or her country of origin. 114
Upon hearing incorrectly from the interpreter that Ms. Li was afraid to
return to China, the inspector transferred Ms. Li to the local jail until she
could be interviewed by a member of the asylum corps. 115 While she was
being held in the local jail, Ms. Li met attorney Margaret Stock, who had
been called by Ms. Li's company and asked to find out what had

107. Li, 259 F.3d at 1133.
108. Id. at 1136.
109. Benson, New World ofJudicial Review, supra note 5, at 246 & n.82.
110. Expedited Removal is a streamlined procedure where no immigration court hearing is
involved in admissibility determinations. See INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) (Westlaw
through P.L. 111-382, approved 2011).
111. Liv. Eddy, 259 F.3d 1132, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001).
112. Anthony Lewis, Abroad At Home, It Can Happen Here, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1997,
Editorial Page; Telephone Interview with Margaret D. Stock, Adjunct Professor, University of
Alaska Anchorage (Oct. 29, 2010); Email from Margaret D. Stock, supra note 106.
113. Email from Margaret D. Stock, supra note 106.
114. INA § 235(b)(l)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 235(b)(4) (Westlaw through Feb. 24, 2011). In
theory, an expedited removal order could be stopped if the inspector's supervisor does not
concur in the assessment of the inspector. See 8 C.F.R. § 235(b)(7).
115. Email from Margaret D. Stock, supra note 106.
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happened. 116 Ms. Li explained that the officer refused to accept her business
visitor visa and that she didn't know why she was injail. 117 Ms. Stock then
learned from INS that they were holding Ms. Li for a credible fear
interview. Ms. Li was adamant that she was not afraid to return to China
and did not want to apply for asylum in the United States. Although Ms.
Stock attempted to speak to the inspectors informally and ask them to
rescind the expedited removal order, the Anchorage District Office
refused. 118 Ms. Stock filed a habeas petition challenging the erroneous
determination of the inspector that Ms. Li was not a bona fide tourist for
business purposes. 119
Prior to the 1996 changes, if a business visitor or other non-immigrant
visa holder was told by an inspector that he or she would not be admitted to
the United States, the individual had the right to seek review of that
inspector's decision before an immigration judge. 120 If the immigration
judge affirmed the agency determination that the person lacked the proper
visa or was otherwise subject to a ground of inadmissibility, the individual
could challenge the exclusion order by filing a habeas petition in federal
district court. 121 The statutory authority for this habeas review was part of
the INA former§ 106. 122 In 1996, Congress created a new form of exclusion
proceedings for two categories of applicants for admission: (1) people who
lacked documents or presented false documents and people who the
inspector found to be making a material misrepresentation; 123 or (2) people
who engaged in fraud in connection with their admission application. 124 The
new expedited removal system authorizes the inspector to determine
whether an individual is subject to either of these grounds of exclusion and
then, with the approval of a "second-line supervisor," 125 formally order the
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Benson, New World of Judicial Review, supra note 5 (discussing the procedures
available prior to 1996 reforms).
121. Id.
122. INA§ 106 (repealed 1996).
123. The specific ground is found in INA § 212(a)(7) and 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(7). INA §
212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § l 182(a)(7) (Westlaw through P.L. 111-382, approved 2011).
124. The specific ground of inadmissibility is found in INA § 212(a)(6)(c) and 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(6)(c) (Westlaw through Dec. 17, 2010).
125. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(7) (Westlaw through Feb. 11, 2011) (Stating that "[a]ny
removal order entered by an examining immigration officer pursuant to section 235(b)(l) of the
Act must be reviewed and approved by the appropriate supervisor before the order is considered
final. Such supervisory review shall not be delegated below the level of the second line
supervisor, or a person acting in that capacity. The supervisory review shall include a review of
the sworn statement and any answers and statements made by the alien regarding a fear of
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individual to be removed. 126 The impact of an expedited removal order is
that the individual is barred from seeking readmission to the United States
for five years. 127 Potentially, the impact is permanent if the ground used to
sustain inadmissibility was fraud or misrepresentation because that finding
could be used to bar future applications for visas or admission to the United
States. 128 Finally, to ensure that the removal proceeds quickly, Congress
eliminated the role of the immigration court except for people who made a
claim of a credible fear of persecution or harm if they were to be
retumed. 129 Later, by regulation, the agency expanded these exceptions to
individuals claiming to be U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, or
persons already granted asylee or refugee status and seeking readmission to
the United States. 130 As a safeguard, Congress created a narrow grant of
specific habeas review in INA § 242(e)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e), that allows
review as follows:
(2) Habeas corpus proceedings
Judicial review of any determination made under section
1225(b)(l) of this title is available in habeas corpus proceedings,
but shall be limited to determinations of(A) whether the petitioner is an alien,
(B) whether the petitioner was ordered removed under such
section, and
(C) whether the petitioner can prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the petitioner is an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, has been admitted as a refugee under section
1157 of this title, or has been granted asylum under section 1158
of this title, such status not having been terminated, and is entitled
to such further inquiry as prescribed by the Attorney General
pursuant to section 1225(b)(l)(C) of this title. 131

removal or return. The supervisory review and approval of an expedited removal order for an
alien described in section 235(b)(l)(A)(iii) of the Act must include a review of any claim of
lawful admission or parole and any evidence or information presented to support such a claim,
prior to approval of the order. In such cases, the supervisor may request additional information
from any source and may require further interview of the alien.")
126. 8 C.F.R. §235.3(b)(2) (Westlaw through Dec. 17, 2010).
127. INA§ 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. §1182 (Westlaw through P.L. 111-382, approved 2011).
128. Id.
129. INA § 235(b){l){A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225{b){l)(A)(i) (Westlaw through P.L. 111-382,
approved 2011); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(ii) (Westlaw through Dec. 17, 2010).
130. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5).
131. INA§ 242(e)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e).
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Ms. Li filed a habeas petition using both the specific provision of the
INA and the general federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 132 The
District Court rejected the habeas petition, flatly stating that Congress had
meant to insulate all expedited removal decisions from judicial review
unless the individual was a citizen or lawful permanent resident. 133 Ms. Li
then filed a petition for review of the denial of habeas. 134 The Ninth Circuit
majority affirmed the lower court and found that Congress had intended to
preclude judicial review. 135 The court ruled that normal habeas review had
been expressly limited to the form and content found in the INA alone. 136
The majority also rejected Ms. Li's argument that her removal violated
procedural due process, finding that an alien who is at the border of the
United States and not yet formally admitted into the interior is not entitled
to the protections of procedural due process. 137
Judge Hawkins wrote a powerful dissent that reveals his philosophical
approach to preserving the role of the court as a guarantor of fair agency
procedure and to ensure the agency acts within its statutory power. Using
conservative canons of statutory construction and the earlier decisions of
the Ninth Circuit, particularly Magana-Pizano 138 preserving the ability of
132. Liv. Eddy, 259 F.3d 1132, 1133-35 (9th Cir. 2001).
133. Id. at 1136.
134. Id. at 1132. Statutory habeas is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2241. An appeal of a federal
denial of habeas can be filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Here Ms. Stock argued that both this
statute and the INA guarantee of habeas within INA § 242(b) authorized judicial review of
whether the government had the authority to use expedited removal in this factual context.
135. Li, 259 F.3d at 1134-35.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1136. Physical presence within the interior has long been a constitutional
dividing line, limiting the rights of non-citizens not yet admitted to the territory of the U.S. The
Ninth Circuit specifically noted that it was not considering whether an individual subjected to
expedited removal procedures who was in the United States might have due process protections.
See id. at 1135. This is an important limitation because the expedited removal procedures are
used within the physical borders of the United States. People apprehended within 100 miles of
the international border who cannot establish they have been in the U.S. for at least fourteen
days or people who have entered illegally by sea who cannot establish that they have been in the
U.S. for at least two years are subject to expedited removal procedures. See Designating Aliens
for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877-81 (proposed Aug. 11, 2004); Notice Designating
Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under Section 235(b)(l)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,924-25 (proposed Nov. 13, 2002). The expedited removal
procedure could, in time, produce more removal orders that the entire removal procedure before
the immigration courts. In fiscal year 2009, 27% of all removal orders were issued by expedited
removal procedures as opposed to court procedures. See DHS ANNUAL REPORT: IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2009 1 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
statistics/publications/enforcement_ar_ 2009 .pdf.
As expedited removal becomes more prevalent it is likely collateral and direct attacks on the
fairness of the procedure will grow.
138. See Magana-Pizano v. I.N.S., 200 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 1999).
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people to raise jurisdictional arguments challenging the sweeping
jurisdictional bars, Judge Hawkins found that Congress had not precluded a
limited form of statutory habeas within the INA:
Congress can expressly remove habeas review, but that is not
what it did in § 1252(e)(2). Rather, Congress limited our review.
In such a situation, we retain jurisdiction to determine whether we
have jurisdiction, just as in part II of Magana-Pizano. The only
way that we can determine whether Li was "ordered removed
under [§ 1225]," § 1252(e)(2)(B), and "whether such an order in
fact was issued,"§ 1252(e)(5), is to determine whether INS has, to
whatever extent, identified any conduct that offends§ 1225. Thus,
the reasoning of part II of Magana-Pizano should control this
case-the legal satisfaction of statutory predicates has to be
determined to establish jurisdiction. 139

Earlier in the decision, Judge Hawkins framed the issue as:
The majority argues that § 1252(e)(2)(B) "does not appear to
permit the court to inquire into whether section 1225(b)(l) was
properly invoked, but only whether it was invoked at all." If true,
this means that INS [now DHS] can issue an expedited removal
order for any alien seeking to enter the United States (other than a
permanent resident, refugee, or asylum-seeker) for any reason,
including clearly improper grounds such as racial or ethnic bias,
and the courts cannot review the legal basis of that order. A
careful reading of § 1252(e)(2)(B), grounded in the overall
expedited removal provisions of IIRIRA, coupled with our
precedent interpreting similar review provisions, compels the
opposite result. 140

While the majority opinion acknowledges Judge Hawkins's critique, it
refused to allow any check on whether the government is properly using the
expedited removal procedure. 141 Judge Hawkins's dissent is grounded in
traditional cannons of statutory construction such as reading the statute
consistently and reading all of the provisions rather than isolating terms in a
particular subsection, but his analysis is clearly informed by a pragmatic
awareness that power wielded in the shadows may become abusive. In the
years that have followed, concern has grown that expedited removal is
being used inappropriately and that the process is almost entirely invisible

139. Liv. Eddy, 259 F.3d 1132, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
140. Id. at 1138 (alteration in original).
141. Id. at 1135.
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to external review. 142 Judge Hawkins wisely foresaw that if the courts
rejected challenges that assert that the agency acted in excess of its
authority, the culture and behavior within the agency might exceed the
narrow parameters Congress intended.
There are other examples of Judge Hawkins's efforts to preserve access
to the federal courts. In 2005, Congress once again revised the judicial
review provisions of the INA. 143 After the U.S. Supreme Court found that
for those individuals who could not seek judicial review of a removal order
in the courts of appeals, access to the federal courts remained via a writ of
habeas corpus; 144 Congress passed the REAL ID Act that restored petitions
for review for most applicants who had previously been barred as a
constitutional substitute for habeas review. 145 The statutory change also
altered the scope of review to specifically include challenges raising
"constitutional claims or questions of law." 146 Soon litigation arose
questioning the meaning of "questions of law." Could a petitioner challenge
mixed questions of law and fact? Could agency decisions, which included
legal conclusions that appear unsupported by the factual record, be
reviewed by the federal courts of appeal? In Ramadan v. Gonzales, 147 Judge
Hawkins and two other members of the Ninth Circuit, in a case of first
impression, addressed one of the critical questions about the scope of the
REAL ID changes. Ms. Ramadan applied for asylum, but filed her
application more than one year after entry to the United States. 148 The INA
specifically allows an immigration judge to accept a late filing but only if
the judge finds that the late filing was based on "exceptional
circumstances." 149 The statute and regulations have basically created two
types of exceptions: (1) country conditions have changed justifying a late
142. Congress did create a special commission to study the impact of expedited removal on
asylum claims. That commission issued a very critical report. See U.S. COMM. ON INT'L
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL (2005), available
at http://www.uscirf.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id= 1892. The ABA
Commission on Immigration has also repeatedly questioned the validity and accuracy of
expedited removal. In a recent report the Commission calls for the restoration of immigration
judge review, increased use of asylum officers for those presenting claims of fear or persecution
and restoration of judicial review. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 6, at
pt. 4.
143. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, § 106(a)(l)(A)(iii) (2005)
(amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2008)).
144. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
145. REAL ID Act§ 106(a)(l)(A)(iii).
146. Id.
147. 479 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2007).
148. Id. at 649.
149. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (Westlaw through P.L. 111-382, approved 2011)
(describing exceptional or changed circumstances); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i)(B).
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filing; or (2) the applicant faced exceptional circumstances that interfered
with her ability to prepare and file a claim. 15° Congress also specifically
precluded judicial review of the immigration judge's determination about
whether one of the statutory circumstances could be met in INA §
208(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § l 158(a)(3). 151 Judge Hawkins wrote the first opinion
in this case and concluded that while the REAL ID amendments had
expanded judicial review of matters that had previously been precluded, the
Ninth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to consider whether or not Ms. Ramadan
had met her burden to establish an exception for a late filing because she
had not presented a claim involving a legal question-a claim involving a
statutory interpretation. 152 The opinion was also careful to note that Ms.
Ramadan had not made the argument that the immigration judge decision
was so unfair or arbitrary that it would have violated procedural due
process. 153
In a rather unusual procedure, the panel accepted a motion for rehearing.
The case was reargued and amici curiae entered the case. 154 The same panel
issued a per curiam decision rejecting their earlier position. 155 Judge
Hawkins and the other members of the panel had clearly changed their view
of the scope of judicial review after the REAL ID amendments. The per
curiam panel now issued a very careful assessment of the statutory purposes
of REAL ID and whether, as required by St. Cyr and the habeas corpus
clause, judicial review of "questions of law" included mixed questions of
law and fact. 156 The opinion goes into detail of the evolution of judicial
review of immigration cases and the traditional content of habeas review. 157
It also examines the legislative history and the conference committee report
discussing the scope of review. 158 The per curiam opinion states:
Because the Conference Report indicates congressional adherence
to St. Cyr' s constitutional mandates, and because preclusion of
judicial review over mixed questions of law and fact would raise
150. 8 U.S.C. § l 158(a)(2)(B)-(D).
151. 151 CONG. REC. H2813-0l, H2873 (daily ed. May 3, 2005) (statement of Rep. Lewis),
2005 WL 1025891 (emphasis added) (cited in Ramadan v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th
Cir. 2005)).
152. Ramadan, 427 F.3d at 1222.
153. Id at 1222 n.6.
154. The ACLU Foundation Immigrant Rights Project and the American Immigration Law
Foundation both appeared as amici. Both organizations had been actively litigating the contours
of the jurisdictional barriers since the first major restrictions appeared in 1996.
155. The panel consisted of Judge Hawkins, Judge Pregerson and Judge Thomas. Ramadan
v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646 (2007).
156. Id. at 650-55.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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serious constitutional questions under St. Cyr, the legislative
history indicates that Congress intended to grant review over such
questions. Cf Chen, 471 F.3d at 378-28 (holding that because
historical habeas review extended beyond statutory construction,
as indicated in St. Cyr, the scope of "questions of law" of the Real
ID Act was similarly extended). Indeed, the Conference Report
explicitly envisions judicial review of mixed questions of law and
fact, stating: "When a court is presented with a mixed question of
law and fact, the court should analyze it to the extent that there are
legal elements, but should not review any factual elements." Id. at
175. This statement squarely fits within our holding, which
mandates review only when the underlying facts are undisputed. 159

In the end, rather like poor Mr. Marbury, 160 the court found jurisdiction,
but no relief for the petition. 161 Ms. Ramadan did not win her petition for
review. The panel found that as a matter of law, her particular undisputed
factual argument about changed conditions did not directly relate to the
basis of her application for asylum and therefore she had not presented a
qualifying changed circumstance justifying a late application. 162 Still, the
opinion is a very important one in examining the power of willing judges to
narrowly construe restraints on federal court jurisdiction.
The government sought en bane redetermination but an insufficient
number of judges voted to rehear en bane and the case ended. 163 Judge
O'Scannlain wrote a dissent, primarily arguing that the opinion extended
jurisdiction beyond the narrow grounds restored by Congress or mandated
by the habeas minimum. 164 He was joined by eight other members of the
court. 165 The Ramadan II decision also stands largely alone as all but the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals have rejected any ability to review the
determination of an immigration judge that an asylum application was
untimely. 166
159. Id. at 653.
160. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
161. Technically in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall found the court had
jurisdiction to determine that as a matter of constitutional law it was unconstitutional for
Congress to have created original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. See id.
162. Ramadan, 479 F.3d at 658.
163. Ramadan v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2007).
164. Id. at 973-74 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 973.
166. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Chen v. U.S. Dep 't of Justice, 471 F.3d
315, 329 n.7 (2d Cir. 2006), that the REAL ID Act did allow review of mixed issues of law and
fact. In later cases, the Second Circuit appears to have also narrowed its review of mixed issues
of law and fact to only review the legal elements. See Gui Yin Liu v. l.N.S, 508 F.3d 716, 722
n.3 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Jessamyn L. Vogel, Note, Ending the Tug of War Between Congress
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This case presents another example where Judge Hawkins and other
members of the Ninth Circuit understood the importance of the petitioner's
ability to challenge the agency's application of procedural and legal
standards. Judge Hawkins's original decision already demonstrated a
sensitivity to the need to preserve review if the agency had acted in a
manner that curtailed due process of law and the later, important per curiam
decision, indicates that with due respect to the Congressional intent and
statutory language, the court was equally concerned with preserving the
ability to right erroneous legal determinations.
It would be an error to state that Judge Hawkins will always creatively
read the INA to the advantage of the non-citizen. In fact, in several
important cases, Judge Hawkins found that the INA denies relief to
individuals who many would find quite sympathetic. For example, in the
case of Mr. Moreno, Judge Hawkins rejected the argument that extreme and
exceptional hardship to his grandchildren, children that he had raised as part
of his immediate family, could qualify them as his children under the
INA. 167 Mr. Moreno lived in the United States for more than ten years and
was eligible to seek cancellation of removal, but only if he could show
hardship to a U.S. citizen's or a permanent resident's "spouse, parent or
child." 168 Although Mr. Moreno had been awarded legal custody of his five
U.S. citizen grandchildren, he had not formally adopted the children. 169 The
Immigration Judge found that short of adoption, Mr. Moreno did not have a
qualifying relative in order to seek cancellation and the resulting permanent
resident status. 170 Judge Hawkins's opinion carefully considered the
statutory interpretation arguments and reviews of prior Ninth Circuit and
Supreme Court decisions that followed the strict definitions of the INA in
defining qualifying family relationships. One can sense Judge Hawkins's
and the Ninth Circuit's empathy for Mr. Moreno in its concluding
paragraphs as the court found that grandchildren were not qualifying
children as defined in the cancellation statute:
Though this result-separating five U.S. citizen children from
their grandfather, who appears to be their only loving and stable
source of care and support-may seem unduly harsh and perhaps
illogical, it is the result dictated by law. Congress is of course free

and the Courts: Discerning the Reviewability of "Changed or Extraordinary Circumstances"
within Section 106 ofthe REAL ID Act of 2005, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 285 (2008).
167. Moreno-Morante v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2007).
168. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D) (Westalw through P.L. 111-382, approved 2011).
169. Moreno-Morante, 490 F.3d at 1174.
170. Id.

43:0007]

SEARCH FOR FAIR AGENCY PROCESS

35

to correct any inequities resulting from our application of its plain
statutory language, as it has done in the past. ...
Moreno's grandchildren thus do not meet the statutory definition
of "child" for purposes of cancellation of removal. Neither do they
qualify by virtue of his de facto parent-child relationship with
them because Congress has specifically precluded such a
functional approach to defining the term "child" for cancellation
ofremoval purposes. 171

In the footnote I omitted in the above quotation, Judge Hawkins gave an
example where Congress acted to overturn a particularly harsh bright line
test in the INA. 172 This opinion and others repeatedly demonstrate that
while Judge Hawkins is willing to carefully consider the statutory limits of
the INA, there are simply times when only Congress has the authority to
remold the terms and conditions of the law.
IV.

STANDING UP FOR FAIRNESS

As I have written, if there is a broad theme in the immigration opinions
of Judge Michael Daly Hawkins, it is that he recognizes the need for fair
procedures. In an interview with one of his former partners, Roxana C.
Bacon, she said:
Immigration law has been my entire career. Mike made time to
listen to my cases, too often stories of administrative law gone off
the rails. Mike understands that recourse to federal courts is often
the only opportunity immigrants have to level the playing field.
His varied professional and personal experience informs his deep
appreciation of the ordinary person's need for law as a protector of
rights. Championing the rights of immigrants in a bureaucratic
system whose rigidity is matched only by its intricacy is
commitment to due process writ large. There is no reward for such
allegiance other than the satisfaction of using law as a tool for
justice. 173
171. Id. at 1178 (footnote omitted).
172. He references the Congressional amendment restoring the ability of an individual to
qualify for suspension of deportation, a precursor to cancellation, even if he or she had brief and
casual departures. Id. at 1178 n. l 0. The Congressional amendment reversed the Supreme
Court's literal reading of the prior statute that no departure in the seven year residence period
could be allowed. Id. (discussing the overruling of I.N.S. v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984)).
173. Interview with Roxana C. Bacon, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Citizenship
and Immigration Ctr. (Aug. 28, 2010). Roxana Bacon was a partner with Judge Hawkins in
three different law firms. She retired from private practice in 2009. She came out of retirement
to serve in the government. She became the General Counsel for the Department of Homeland

36

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

During our discussion, Judge Hawkins and I agreed that his upbringing
in Winslow, Arizona, a hardscrabble town in Northern Arizona, and his
success in different and challenging environments made him a unique
federal judge. His varied professional and personal experience informs his
deep appreciation of the ordinary person's need for law as a protector of
rights. Playing baseball in the rural West means you understand how a noncontact sport can be played so hard it draws blood. Graduating at the top of
the class at Arizona State University means you have your eye on the prize.
Everyone in law knows that serving in the Marine Corps is not for the fainthearted. Managing successful campaigns in places where the Minutemen
stand proud requires every strategic skill. Being the U.S. Attorney who
invokes civil rights laws to bring brutal criminals to justice defines
professional integrity and courage. Roxana Bacon commented, "Now I read
his thoughtful and well-crafted opinions with particular pleasure because I
trace his roots through his prose. Mike's multiple careers and interests are
never flaunted, but they are the bedrock for his view that law is the fulcrum
for fairness." 174
Judge Hawkins has also made a lasting contribution to the adjudication
process. Juan Osuna, former chair of the BIA, wrote to me:
Judge Hawkins in particular has always stressed the paramount
necessity for robust adjudication at the administrative level, as a
way of giving the federal courts confidence that the immigrants'
claims are being handled appropriately, carefully and according to
due process protections. His insights and those of other federal
judges have been invaluable to immigration judges and the BIA.
His actions and efforts represent those of a true public servant. He
saw a problem represented by the rising caseload, engaged in a
productive way with the various players in the system, provided
useful feedback that has helped improve the system. 175

After reading the past fifteen years of Judge Hawkins immigration cases,
and considering his published opinions as well as many of the memorandum
decisions issued by panels including Judge Hawkins, it is clear that the
Ninth Circuit has been and continues to be one of the most important
developers of immigration law. Unfortunately, the law is developed in a
cauldron overflowing with cases in a murky soup of administrative
opinions, constitutional law, and narrow opportunities for judicial review.
The restrictions on judicial review make it particularly difficult for courts to
Security, Citizenship and Immigration Service and left office at the end of 2010. Her comment
is personal and not meant to represent any official view of the federal government.
174. Id.
175. Interviews and Emails with Juan Osuna, supra note 16.
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play a significant role in the development of immigration law. Yet,
attorneys are likely to keep trying to find a way to expand individual rights
in immigration law as significant immigration reform does not appear to be
a political priority in the winter of 2010. 176 It is to be hoped that Senior
Judge Hawkins will not give up his efforts to improve immigration
adjudication within the administrative courts charged with adjudicating
immigration claims and the Ninth Circuit. Knowing his lifelong pattern of
standing up for principle and fairness, I believe we can expect to be learning
from Judge Hawkins's opinions and actions for many years to come.

176. For a recent symposium addressing possible restructuring or other administrative
reforms in immigration adjudication, see the Fortieth Annual Administrative Law Symposium,
59 DUKE L.J. 1501 (2010), in particular, Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration
A<!judication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635 (2010); Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the
A<!judication of Immigration Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1501 (2010); and Russel L. Wheeler,
Practical Impediments to Structural Reform and the Promise of Third Branch Analytic
Methods: A Reply to Professors Baum and Legomsky, 59 DUKE L.J. 1847 (2010).
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